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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-3145 
_____________ 
 
TRACY MURRAY,  
on behalf of The Est. of Albert Purnell, II (Deceased) 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA;  
PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
DAVID ERBELE, Police Officer;  
NICHOLAS HALBHERR, Police Officer 
 
Tracy Murray, 
               Appellant  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-11-cv-06900) 
Hon. C. Darnell Jones, II 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 15, 2018 
 
Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, FUENTES, 
Circuit Judges. 
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(Filed: August 21, 2018) 
 
Tracy Murray, appellant pro se 
1530 East Maryland Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19138 
 
Daniel J. Auerbach 
City of Philadelphia Law Department 
1515 Arch Street, 17th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA  19102 
 
Counsel for Appellees 
 
Will W. Sachse, Esq. 
Ellen L. Mossman, Esq. 
Dechert LLP 
Cira Centre 
2929 Arch Street 
Philadelphia, PA  19104 
 
Chase McReynolds 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
3400 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
(Admitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 46.3) 
 
 Amicus Curiae 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
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 Tracy Murray was named the administrator of her son’s 
estate, of which her son’s daughter was the sole beneficiary.  
Murray instituted a civil rights lawsuit on behalf of the estate 
and now appeals an adverse judgment entered after a jury trial 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Although Murray was represented by counsel 
in the District Court, she filed this appeal pro se.  We hold that 
a non-attorney who is not a beneficiary of the estate may not 
conduct a case pro se on behalf of the estate.  As a result, we 
will dismiss Murray’s appeal. 
 
I. 
 
David Erbele and Nicholas Halbherr, Philadelphia 
police officers, shot and killed Albert Purnell, II.  Purnell died 
intestate.  Purnell’s minor daughter is the sole beneficiary of 
the estate.  See 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2103.  Murray, Purnell’s 
mother, hired an attorney and obtained letters of administration 
to act on behalf of her son’s estate.  Murray filed a lawsuit in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia on behalf of the 
estate alleging excessive force against the City of Philadelphia, 
Erbele, and Halbherr under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.  
The City removed the case to the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Murray withdrew 
her state-law claims.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment to the City on Murray’s § 1983 claim, but allowed 
her remaining § 1983 claim against Erbele and Halbherr to 
proceed to a jury trial.  The officers’ chief defense at trial was 
that they had used deadly force in self-defense.  The jury 
returned verdicts in favor of Erbele and Halbherr.  
 
Murray subsequently filed a pro se notice of appeal.  
This Court ordered the pro bono appointment of amicus curiae 
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to address whether Murray may proceed pro se on behalf of 
Purnell’s estate.1   
 
II. 
 
 We must decide whether Murray, a non-attorney, may 
litigate an appeal pro se as the non-beneficiary administrator of 
her son’s estate.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1654, “the parties may 
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel” in 
the federal courts.  Section 1654 thus ensures that a person may 
conduct his or her own case pro se or retain counsel to do so.  
See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (“The statutory right to proceed pro se reflects a 
respect for the choice of an individual citizen to plead his or 
her own cause.” (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. 
of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990))).   
 
 Although an individual may represent herself or himself 
pro se, a non-attorney may not represent other parties in federal 
court.  See Collingsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 
232 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The rule that a non-lawyer may not 
represent another person in court is a venerable common law 
rule.”), abrogated on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel. 
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007).  
This principle has been applied by the Supreme Court, this 
                                              
1  We express our gratitude to amicus curiae counsel Ellen 
L. Mossman and Will W. Sachse of Dechert LLP, and Chase 
McReynolds of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
and commend them for their high-quality assistance.  The 
amicus curiae counsel also addressed whether an estate may be 
granted in forma pauperis status.  Because of our holding, we 
need not consider this issue.   
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Court, and other courts in various contexts.  See, e.g., Rowland 
v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) (recognizing 
that corporations must be represented by counsel and that “save 
in a few aberrant cases, the lower courts have uniformly held 
that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 . . . does not allow corporations, 
partnerships or associations to appear in federal court 
otherwise through a licensed attorney” (footnote omitted)); 
Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that a non-lawyer could not litigate pro se on behalf 
of an ERISA plan); Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 882 (“We hold 
that Osei-Afriyie, a non-lawyer appearing pro se, was not 
entitled to play the role of attorney for his children in federal 
court.”); Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 411–12 (2d Cir. 
1976) (holding that a non-attorney could not appear pro se to 
conduct a shareholder’s derivative suit). 
 
 We turn to whether a non-attorney, non-beneficiary 
administrator like Murray conducts her “own case” when 
representing an estate in federal court.  28 U.S.C. § 1654.  The 
answer is no.  If an estate has one or more beneficiaries besides 
the administrator, then the case is not the administrator’s own 
because the interests of other parties are directly at stake.  The 
interests of other parties, such as beneficiaries,2 may not be 
represented by a non-attorney administrator of an estate.  
Accordingly, we hold that this case is not Murray’s own and 
                                              
2  Other courts have indicated that an estate’s creditors 
may also have interests in that estate.  See, e.g., Rodgers v. 
Lancaster Police & Fire Dep’t, 819 F.3d 205, 211 (5th Cir. 
2016); Jones ex rel. Jones v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 401 F.3d 
950, 952 (8th Cir. 2005); Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 
393 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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that she may not conduct it pro se on behalf of her 
granddaughter, the estate’s sole beneficiary.     
 
 Our holding accords with those of our sister Courts of 
Appeals to consider the question we decide today.3  Further, 
practical considerations support our holding.  Attorneys’ 
training, experience, and their “ethical responsibilities and 
obligations” help ensure that a represented party’s interests are 
not squandered.  Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 231; see Osei-Afriyie, 
937 F.2d at 882 (holding that a pro se father’s “lack of legal 
experience has nearly cost his children the chance ever to have 
any of their claims heard.”).  Only attorneys may be sued for 
legal malpractice; a represented party could not seek recourse 
against a non-attorney for even the most egregious conduct.  
                                              
3  See, e.g., Rodgers, 819 F.3d at 211 (holding that a 
person may represent an estate pro se “if that person is the only 
beneficiary and the estate has no creditors”); Malone v. 
Nielson, 474 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[I]f 
the administrator is not the sole beneficiary of the estate, then 
he or she may not represent the estate in court.”); Jones, 401 
F.3d at 952 (“[The administrator] is not the only 
beneficiary/creditor of [the] . . . estate.  Thus, as a non-
attorney, [he] may not engage in the practice of law on behalf 
of others.”); Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970–71 (6th 
Cir. 2002); Pridgen, 113 F.3d at 393 (“[A]n administratrix . . . 
of an estate may not proceed pro se when the estate has 
beneficiaries or creditors other than the litigant.”); see also 
Reshard v. Britt, 839 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc) 
(plurality opinion) (per curiam) (affirming by operation of law 
as a result of an equally divided en banc court the district 
court’s ruling that estate representatives could not proceed pro 
se when the estate had other beneficiaries).   
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See Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 231.  Accordingly, our holding 
limiting pro se representation pursuant to § 1654 “serve[s] the 
interests of the represented party as well as the interests of 
adversaries and the court.”  Pridgen, 113 F.3d at 393.   
 
  Our decision is not based on Murray’s particular 
abilities or motivations.  Murray is Purnell’s mother and the 
grandmother of the estate’s beneficiary.  With that in mind, we 
have no reason to doubt her sincere desire to zealously advance 
the claims she has brought.  Nevertheless, the law governing 
representation in federal courts requires us to conclude that as 
a non-attorney and non-beneficiary of the estate, she may not 
represent the estate pro se because this case is not Murray’s 
own within the meaning of § 1654.  This Court advised Murray 
on October 27, 2016 and March 29, 2017 that a non-attorney 
could not represent an estate and granted her time to obtain 
counsel on the estate’s behalf.   Because it is clear that Murray 
is unable or unwilling to obtain counsel for the estate, dismissal 
is appropriate at this time. 
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Murray’s 
appeal on behalf of the estate.  Murray’s motions for the 
appointment of counsel and motion for transcript copies at the 
government’s expense are dismissed as moot.  
 
